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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent, *
-vs-

:

case No
14242

RAYMOND GLENN DODGE,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a conviction of the
crime of Aggravated Robbery.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried to a jury which found the
appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime
of Aggravated Robbery.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an Order of this Court affirming
the judgment and sentence rendered by the Court below.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Shortly after midnight June 11, 1975 a
man took approximately $58 0.00 at gunpoint from
Rhea Selvadge, a cashier at the Ming Restaurant located
in Granger.

At trial, Mrs. Selvadge positively

identified this robber as Lawrence Morgan, appellant's
co-defendant at trial (T.8).

Mrs. Selvadge further

testified that during the course of the robbery
a second man came up to the cash register, told the
first man to hurry, and aided him in carrying the
money from the store (T.10).

Mrs. Selvadge was unable

to give a positive identification of the second
individual, but was able to give a description (T.10-12).
As the two men fled the scene, Donna Shortino, a
waitress at the Ming Restaurant, and Ned Frandson,
an off-duty Salt Lake County Deputy Sheriff, ran into
the parking lot in time to observe a car leave.
Miss Shortino described the car as a gold sedan (T.43).
Officer Frandson described the vehicle as a gold or
brown medium sized car with square tail lights, either
a Ford Fairlane, Plymouth Duster, or Dodge Dart
(T.53).

Both witnesses testified that the car headed

v/est from the restaurant which is located at 35th South
and 20th West (T.47,55).

Officer Frandson attempted

to follow the car but was unsuccessful.

Two witnesses
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who had observed the gold car leave the parking lot
informed Officer Frandson that the car contained
three occupants; two males, whom they described, and
a female (T.54,56,119).

Of ficer Frandson broadcast

this information over his car radio at 12:18 a.m.
(T.54,137).
At 12:25 a.m. Officer Twitchell observed
a new gold Duster headed north on 27th West at
approximately 22nd South (T.62,137).

He followed

the car and beamed a spotlight into it in order to
observe the occupants.

After Officer Twitchell had

determined that there were three occupants, two
males who matched the descriptions broadcast and
a female, he stopped the car and ordered the individuals
to leave the vehicle.
car, the officer

After the suspects left the

discovered a pistol similar to

the one used in the robbery.

At this point, all

three individuals were arrested and the search incident
to that arrest uncovered a pair of gloves in the
rear seat of the car, and approximately $580.00 in
cash, checks and IOUfs in a purse inside the car
(T.66,80).

Mrs. Selvadge testified that the gloves

and the pistol were similar to those used at the
robbery, and positively identified an IOU as one taken
from the cash register (T.11,12).

Lawrence Morgan,

who was identified
Mrs.
Selvadge
asLawone
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robbers, was the driver of the vehicle stopped by
Officer Twitchell.

Appellant was riding in the rear

seat (T.63).
At the trial of this case, on motion of
appellant's counsel, the rule excluding witnesses
from the courtroom was invoked, and the witnesses
were admonished not to discuss their testimony with
anyone except counsel (T.6-7).

During the noon

recess, the State's attorney questioned several
of the witnesses as a group.

Appellant moved for

a mistrial on the grounds of the witnesses' misconduct, and the trial court denied the motion
(T.35,196).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING •
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL OR ARREST OF
JUDGMENT BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO
ESTABLISH DEFENDANT'S GUILT BEYOND A REASONABLE
DOUBT.
At the trial of this case, the State introduced direct testimony that established an Aggravated
Robbery was committed by an armed individual at the
time and place in question.

The State introduced
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further direct testimony that a second male individual
assisted in the robbery.

This second individual is

clearly guilty of Aggravated Robbery under the
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (Supp. 1975)
which provides that:
"Every person. . . who directly
commits the offense. . . or intentionally aids another person
to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense shall be
criminally liable as a party for
such conduct."
The State produced no direct evidence that
established appellant's identity as the second
individual involved in the robbery, but a wealth
of circumstantial evidence was produced to establish
appellant's identity as the guilty party.

In State

v. Schad, 24 U.2d 255, 470 P.2d 246 (1970), this Court
reaffirmed the proposition that a conviction can be
had on circumstantial evidence if it excludes
every reasonable hypothesis except the guilt of the
defendant.

The court went on to state that:
"Unless upon our review of the
evidence, and the reasonable inferences fairly to be deduced therefrom, it appears that there was no
reasonable basis therein for such
a conclusion, we should not overturn
the verdict." 24 Utah 2d at 257.
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The testimony offered in behalf of the
State, if believed by the jury, would establish
the following:

Two male individuals committed

an Aggravated Robbery, and fled the scene in the
company of a woman in a gold colored, Duster-like
car.

Within a few moments and a few blocks of the

crime, the appellant was found in a gold Duster in
the company of one individual postively identified
as the armed robber/and a woman.

The car contained

a gun and a pair of gloves similar to the ones used
at the robbery, money in an amount similar to that
taken at the robbery, and an IOU positively identified
as having been seized at the time of the crime.
Appellant has not suggested any reasonable hypothesis
consistent with the above facts and the inferences
fairly to be drawn from them other than appellantfs
guilt.

Surveying the evidence and the reasonable

inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most
favorable to the jury's verdict, it cannot be said
that a reasonable jury would necessarily entertain some
substantial doubt of appellant's guilt.

It is not

error to deny a motion for a new trial if there is
sufficient evidence from which a jury might find a
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defendant guilty.
P.2d 746 (1948).

State v.. BeBee, 113 U. ,398, 195
The jury's verdict was amply supported

by the evidence, and respondent respectfully submits
that the trial court committed no error in denying
appellantfs motions.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL OR AN ARREST
OF JUDGMENT ON THE BASIS OF THE ALLEGED VIOLATION
OF THE RULE EXCLUDING WITNESSES OR AN ADMONITION
IMPOSED BY THE COURT
At the beginning of trial, on motion of
appellant's counsel, the trial court placed all
witnesses under the rule excluding them from the
courtroom, and admonished the witnesses not to
discuss the case with anyone but counsel (T.7).
During the noon recess, the State's attorney interviewed several witnesses as a group.

Appellant

made a motion for a mistrial on the ground that
this conduct was in violation of the courts admonition.
Appellant made no motion to strike or exclude the
violating witnesses' testimonies, nor did he request
the court to instruct the jury that the violation
of the admonition was a factor to be considered in
determining the witnesses1 credibility.

Appellant's counsel
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to his client by reason of the out-of-court discussion.
It is in the first instance doubtful whether
this conduct on the part of the v/itnesses was a
violation of the admonition of the Court.

The

State's attorney did not consider the admonition
to have been violated, and his view was entirely
reasonable considering that discussions with
counsel were specifically excepted.

Even appellant's

attorney admitted that the discussion was not an
intentional violation of the rule (T.3 6).. It is
within the sound discretion of the trial court
to determine if an admonition not to discuss
testimony has in fact been violated.

Gomez v.

People, 115 Colo. 507, 395 P.2d 462 (1964).
Assuming that the prosecution's witnesses
did violate the admonition, enforcement of the rule
is also committed to the court's discretion.

State

v. Bergen, 13 Wash. App. 974, 538 P.2d 533 (1975).
Failure of the appellant to avail himself of less
drastic means of limiting the possible prejudice
to himself does not warrant the granting of a
new trial.

In any event, as the discussions

have already occurred, it is unlikely that a new
trial would be any less prejudicial to appellant.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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There is no just reason to grant appellantfs
request for a new trial unless there is a showing
that he has been prejudiced in his right to a
fair trial. Appellant has contended that he should
not be required to meet this burden because it is
too difficult, and would require a detailed knowledge
of the offending discussions.
case.

This is not the

First, prejudice can be shown if any

witnesses were to testify in a manner not anticipatedr
or if the subject matter of the testimony was such
that a comparison of the stories would be damaging.
Neither of these factors were present in the case.
Each witness testified consistently with prior
statements, and the subject matter of their testimony
did not lend itself to dovetailing.

Before a new

trial should be granted, it is surely more fair to
require appellant to demonstrate that he has been
damaged, than to cast upon the State the impossible
burden of proving the absence of prejudice.
In the case of State v. Carlsen, 25 U.2d
305, 480 P.2d 736 (1971) this court held that
the failure of the court to admonish witnesses not
to discuss their testimonies was not reversible error
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because,, inter alia, "there is no indication as to how
whatever may have been discussed (which is not shown
except in generality) would have had any adverse
affect upon the defendant." 25 U.2d at 309.

In the

recent case of State v. Vaughn, 554 P.2d 210 (Utah
1976), this court stated that:
11

. • . whether the exclusion rule
has been violated is within the
sound discretion of the trial
court and that to declare a mistrial, the onus is on the accused
to demonstrate that he has been
prejudiced," 554 P.2d at 212
Respondent submits that appellant is not
entitled to a new trial because of a questionable
violation that has resulted in no demonstrable
prejudice,
CONCLUSION
Respondent submits that the appellant was in
all respects given a fair trial, and that the verdict was in accord with the weight of the evidence.
In the interest of justice, respondent asks that
the verdict and judgment below be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
WILLIAM W. BARRETT
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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